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The idea of ͞liƋuiditǇ͟ as a ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐ of the pƌeseŶt phase of ŵodeƌŶitǇ, ǁhiĐh featuƌes iŶ the 
most recent work of Zygmunt Bauman, invites comparison with Keynes. In both Bauman and 
Keynes, liquidity is applied to relationships that are easily revertible (or revertible at low cost) and 
to systems that are unstable and precarious due to the precariousness of the bonds that unite 
their constituent elements. In both authors, liquidity and speculation appear as rational responses 
to uncertainty and, at the same time, as individual strategies that contribute to increased risk at 
the level of the system. The two approaches are complementary and coherent. This comparative 
reading suggests the existence of transversal liquidity mechanisms that cut across different 
institutional domains, as described in this paper.  
Keywords: Liquid modernity; liquidity mechanisms; uncertainty; Bauman; Keynes. 
 
1. Introduction 
The pƌeseŶĐe of the KeǇŶesiaŶ ǁoƌd ͞liƋuiditǇ͟ iŶ the title of )ǇgŵuŶt BauŵaŶ͛s ďook Liquid 
Modernity is more than mere coincidence. In Bauman, liquidity is invoked in order to explain 
a soĐietǇ ǁhiĐh, due to its ǁeak ƌesistaŶĐe ͞against the sepaƌatioŶ of the atoŵs͟ ;Bauman, 
2000: 2), has difficulty keeping its shape. In Keynes, it refers to a property of the financial 
markets – the ease with which agents may divest themselves of their assets and acquire 
others with which to replace them. Nonetheless, in both Bauman and Keynes, liquidity is 
applied to relationships that are easily revertible, or revertible at low cost, and to systems 
that are unstable and precarious due to the precariousness of the bonds that unite their 
constituent elements. Foƌ ďoth, liƋuiditǇ is a fittiŶg ŵetaphoƌ ͞ǁheŶ ǁe ǁish to gƌasp the 
nature of the present, in many ways novel, phase, iŶ the histoƌǇ of ŵodeƌŶitǇ͟ ;BauŵaŶ, 
2000: 2).  
At first sight, the parallelism does not take us much beyond these observations. The two 
analyses are situated on different planes. While Bauman is concerned with different 
ŵaŶifestatioŶs of ͞the sepaƌatioŶ of the atoŵs,͟ taking as reference the totality of social and 
existential experience, Keynes, more modestly, deals with individual strategies and their 
                                                          
*
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systemic consequences within the more precise institutional domain of the monetary and 
financial markets.  
However, as it happens, the two approaches are complementary and coherent. The 
liquidity of the financial markets analysed by Keynes is a manifestation of a generalised 
process in a particular domain which, for Bauman (2000: ϭϮϭͿ, is the ͞paƌaŵouŶt souƌĐe of 
uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ͟ aŶd the oƌigiŶ of pƌoĐesses ǁhiĐh teŶd to eǆteŶd aŶd become widespread. 
Moreover, the comparison suggests that liquidity is manifested in a similar way in different 
spaces of social and personal life – a similarity that suggests the existence of transversal 
liquidity mechanisms.  
In this paper, I shall not undertake a critical reading of Bauman and Keynes, but rather a 
joint interpretation of both, oriented towards an examination of hypothetical liquidity 
mechanisms operating transversally across different institutional domains. In the pages that 
follow, I shall first present the theses of Bauman and Keynes, or at least interpretations of 
them that have arisen from the comparative reading. These interpretations will support my 
identification of the various liquidity mechanisms described in Section 4. The discussion of 
trends arising from these hypothetically described mechanisms is left to the concluding 
notes.  
 
Ϯ. BauŵaŶ’s liquidity 
Liquidity, as a metaphor for commercial society, was not invented by Bauman. He himself 
recognises this fact when alludiŶg to the ͞ŵeltiŶg of solids͟ in the Communist Manifesto. It is 
relevant to recall here that, in the Manifesto, the ͞ŵeltiŶg of solids͟ ĐoŶĐeƌŶed the ͞pitiless͟ 
teaƌiŶg asuŶdeƌ ďǇ the ďouƌgeoisie ͞of all feudal, patƌiaƌĐhal, idǇlliĐ ƌelatioŶs,͟ ǁhiĐh left ͞Ŷo 
other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, thaŶ Đallous ͚Đash paǇŵeŶt͛͟ 
(Marx & Engels, 1848: 9Ϳ. The ƌefeƌeŶĐe to Thoŵas CaƌlǇle aŶd his ͞Đash Ŷeǆus͟ shoǁs that 
Maƌǆ͛s ĐƌitiƋues ĐoiŶĐided ǁith those ŵade ďǇ the ‘oŵaŶtiĐ ĐƌitiĐs of Đapitalisŵ ;͞feudal 
socialists,͟ in the language of the Manifesto) on at least on one point, namely their horror at 
the imposition of commercial relations as the only form of human interaction. However, the 
siŵilaƌitǇ oďǀiouslǇ eŶded theƌe; foƌ ǁhile the ‘oŵaŶtiĐ ͞feudal soĐialists͟ adǀoĐated a 
return to patriarchal relatioŶs iŶ teƌŵs that, despite the ͞iŶĐisiǀeŶess͟ of theiƌ ĐƌitiƋue, ǁeƌe 
͞half laŵeŶtatioŶ, half laŵpooŶ; half eĐho of the past, half ŵeŶaĐe of the futuƌe͟ ;Maƌǆ & 
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Engels, 1848: 30), Marx and Engels aspired to emancipation and predicted that it would 
come in the future.  
Thus, we can understand why Hirschman, in his discussion of the rival interpretations of 
the market society (Hirschman, 1982), included Marx and the Romantic critics of capitalism 
iŶ the saŵe ĐategoƌǇ, ŶaŵelǇ ͞self-destruction theses,͟ which covers all perspectives that 
hold that ͞Đapitalist soĐietǇ […] eǆhiďits a pƌoŶouŶĐed proclivity toward undermining the 
moral foundations on which any society, including the capitalist variety, must rest.͟ 
(Hirschman, 1982: 1466). However, as noted by Hirschman, Marx limited himself to 
highlighting the corrosion of traditional values in bourgeois society, never developing his 
reasoning along the lines of an implosion of capitalism as a result of the liquefaction of its 
moral foundations. For Hirschman, the paradigmatic Đases of the ͞self-destƌuĐtioŶ thesis͟ 
were Schumpeter, Horkheimer and Hirsch. Today, 25 years later, Hirschman might possibly 
have considered including Bauman in the same category.  
 
2.1. The two phases of the great transformation 
Given liquiditǇ͛s loŶg liŶeage as a ŵetaphoƌ foƌ the ŵaƌket soĐietǇ, it is suƌpƌisiŶg that it now 
appears in Bauman associated only to the ͞present stage of the ŵodeƌŶ eƌa͟ (Bauman, 2000: 
2).  
‘eĐogŶisiŶg that the ͞ŵeltiŶg of solids͟ is a peƌŵaŶeŶt featuƌe of ŵodeƌŶitǇ, Bauman 
aƌgues that the ͞gƌeat tƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶ͟ ŵust haǀe oĐĐuƌƌed iŶ tǁo phases. In the first, the 
͞solids͟ ǁeƌe the patteƌŶs of pƌe-modern dependence and interaction; these solids were 
broken, but immediately replaced by others that were as hard as the previous ones – 
individuals were torn from their traditional relationships of dependency and belonging, but 
iŵŵediatelǇ thƌust iŶto ͞fƌaŵes ǁhiĐh […] encapsulated the totality of life conditions and 
life prospects and determined the range of realistic life pƌojeĐts aŶd life stƌategies͟ ;BauŵaŶ, 
2000: 7), i.e. social classes, sexual difference or the Fordist factory. In the second phase (i.e. 
todaǇͿ, these Ŷeǁ ͞solids͟ aƌe ďeiŶg liƋuefied, as the patteƌŶs of depeŶdeŶĐe aŶd 
interaction become malleable to a point that could never have been experienced or even 
imagined by past generations, and without anything tangible or lasting arising to replace 
them:  
 
These daǇs, patteƌŶs aŶd ĐoŶfiguƌatioŶs aƌe Ŷo loŶgeƌ ͚giǀeŶ͛, let aloŶe ͚self-eǀideŶt͛; theƌe aƌe 
just too ŵaŶǇ of theŵ, ĐlashiŶg ǁith oŶe aŶotheƌ aŶd ĐoŶtƌadiĐtiŶg eaĐh otheƌ͛s 
RCCS Annual Review, 1, September 2009                                                                                                                                           Liquidity Mechanisms  
135 
commandments, so that each one has been stripped of a good deal of compelling, coercively 
constraining powers. (Bauman, 2000: 7) 
 
Let us look in a little more detail at each of the phases of the great transformation, as 
presented in condensed form in Bauman (2001). At the beginning, modernity appeared in 
the form of freedom – and the beginning, iŶ BauŵaŶ͛s histoƌǇ of ŵodeƌŶitǇ, was when God 
appeared to man in the Renaissance, in this case to Pico della Mirandola, announcing that, 
uŶlike the otheƌ Đƌeatuƌes that ͞haǀe a defiŶed Ŷatuƌe pƌesĐƌiďed ďǇ ŵe, Ǉou ŵaǇ deteƌŵiŶe 
Ǉouƌ oǁŶ liŵits aĐĐoƌdiŶg to Ǉouƌ oǁŶ ǁill͟ ;BauŵaŶ, ϮϬϬϭ: ϮϭͿ. This ǁas the eŵaŶĐipatoƌǇ 
face of modernity.  
The ͞ĐoŶstitutive act of modern capitalism,͟ as Bauman recalls, involved breaking with 
the old economy based upon the production of use value to satisfy domestic or community 
needs, uprooting both businesses and labour in the process: ͞That douďle aĐt set the aĐtioŶs 
of profit-ŵakiŶg, as ǁell as ŵakiŶg oŶe͛s liǀelihood, fƌee fƌoŵ the ǁeď of ŵoƌal aŶd 
emotional, family and neighbourly bonds – but by the same token, it also emptied such 
actions of all the meaŶiŶgs it used to ĐaƌƌǇ ďefoƌe͟ (Bauman, 2001: 29). For the 
entƌepƌeŶeuƌ, ͞the sepaƌatioŶ of ďusiŶess fƌoŵ the household ǁas a geŶuiŶe eŵaŶĐipatioŶ. 
His hands had been unbound, the sky was the sole limit beyond which his ambition did not 
daƌe ƌeaĐh͟ (Bauman, 2001: 30). But for the workers, uprooted from their communities of 
origin and thrust onto the factory floor, the separation transformed labour from a 
purposeful activity into mere drudgery devoid of any kind of dignity. For the craftsmen and 
peasants of yesterday,  
 
[…] it ǁas Ŷo loŶgeƌ Đleaƌ […] ǁhat ͚ǁoƌk ǁell doŶe͛ ǁould ŵeaŶ. […] Following the soulless 
routine of the factory floor, watched by no kinsman or neighbour but solely by the constantly 
suspicious and rat-smelling foreman, going through machine-dictated motions with no chance 
to admire the product of one͛s eǆeƌtioŶs, let aloŶe to sit iŶ judgeŵeŶt oŶ its ƋualitǇ, ƌeŶdered 
the effoƌt all ďut ͚futile͛. (Bauman, 2001: 29) 
 
And, as human beings resisted the futility of effort, and this resistance was interpreted as 
laziness – the aversion to work that appears in economics textbooks – work could only be 
obtained by coercion, combined with convenient doses of moralist exhortation designed to 
induce consent. The dual movement of separation thus revealed the other face of 
modernity: ͞The ŵodeƌŶ – capitalist – arrangement of human cohabitation was Janus-faced; 
one face was emancipatory, the other coercive, each being turned towards a different 
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seĐtioŶ of soĐietǇ͟ (Bauman, 2001: 26). IŶ the fiƌst phase of the ͞gƌeat tƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶ,͟ 
Bauman (2001: 30) concludes, ͞ŵodeƌŶ Đapitalisŵ [...] ͚ŵelted all solids͛; [...] ďut the ŵeltiŶg 
job was not an end in itself: solids were liquefied so that new solids, more solid than the 
melted ones, could be cast.͟  
But modernity, at the same time that it bound subordinates to the factory floor where 
they could be easily supervised, also obliged the supervisors to remain in their watch towers, 
thus creating a situation of mutual dependence. United in the Panopticon, for better or for 
worse, its inhabitants knew that this was both a theatre of conflict and a negotiating table. 
Management, in this framework, was an exercise that oscillated between the coercive 
imposition of routines and attempts to recreate in ǀitƌo a Ŷeǁ ͞seŶse of ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ.͟ The 
Fordist factory, writes Bauman (2001: 37), whiĐh ͞atteŵpted to sǇŶthesize ďoth teŶdeŶĐies,͟ 
was paradigmatic of another facet of this phase of modernity: the idea that order in 
production and society had to be managed.  
The seĐoŶd stage of the ͞gƌeat tƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶ͟ ďegaŶ, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to BauŵaŶ iŶ teƌms 
borrowed from Marx, the moment the owner of the instruments discovered that he was not 
obliged to conduct the orchestra: ͞As sooŶ as theǇ Đould affoƌd it, Đapitalist eŶtƌepƌeŶeuƌs 
shifted ŵaŶageƌial Đhoƌes to hiƌed seƌǀaŶts͟ ;BauŵaŶ, ϮϬϬϭ: ϯϵͿ.  
But this ǁas oŶlǇ aŶ iŶteƌŵediate stage, ĐoƌƌespoŶdiŶg to aŶ episodiĐ ͞managerial 
capitalism.͟ The moment when managers would repeat the act of disengagement was soon 
to aƌƌiǀe, iŶauguƌatiŶg ͞tiŵes of high speed aŶd high aĐĐeleƌatioŶ, shƌiŶkiŶg teƌŵs of 
commitment, of ͚fleǆiďilitǇ͛, ͚doǁŶsiziŶg͛ aŶd ͚outsouƌĐiŶg͛, tiŵes ǁheŶ people staǇed 
togetheƌ oŶlǇ ͚uŶtil fuƌtheƌ ŶotiĐe͛ aŶd as loŶg ;Ŷeǀeƌ loŶgeƌͿ ͚as the satisfaĐtioŶ lasts͛͟ 
(Bauman, 2001: 41). In short, this was liquid modernity.  
In post-panoptic modernity – liquid modernity – the art of escape has become the 
principal technique for consolidating power. Deregulation is sought because the powerful do 
not want to be regulated – ͞foƌ poǁeƌ to ďe fƌee to floǁ, the ǁoƌld ŵust ďe fƌee of feŶĐes, 
barriers, fortified ďoƌdeƌs aŶd ĐheĐkpoiŶts͟ ;BauŵaŶ, ϮϬϬϬ: 14) – but also because they no 
longer need to regulate anyone. Now, obedience is obtained by the simple threat of 
disengagement or exit: ͞Aŵidst uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ aŶd iŶseĐuƌitǇ, disĐipliŶe ;oƌ ƌatheƌ, suďŵissioŶ 
to the ͚theƌe is Ŷo alteƌŶatiǀe͛ ĐoŶditioŶͿ is self-propelling and self-ƌepƌoduĐiŶg͟ ;BauŵaŶ, 
2001: 42), making those obedience factories, the expensive panopticons, superfluous.  
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The dismantling of the panopticons is experienced by individuals (and even by Bauman) 
with some perplexity. On the one hand, the panopticon regime was cruel and inhuman, and 
in this sense, its disappearance may be considered a form of liberation. But, on the other, it 
had ͞soŵe advantages for the victims – it brought them benefits which were hardly noticed 
at the tiŵe aŶd haǀe oŶlǇ ƌeĐeŶtlǇ ďeĐoŵe salieŶt thƌough theiƌ disappeaƌaŶĐe͟ ;BauŵaŶ, 
2001: 42): it provided them with ͞a trustworthy frame͟ in which they could ͞confidently 
inscribe their hopes and dreams of a better future,͟ and it gave meaning to their struggle for 
better living conditions.  
 
2.2. Individualization in liquid modernity 
The form taken by modernity at present – liquid modernity – is distinguished from the 
previous one, according to Bauman (2000: 29), not only by the collapse of the belief in an 
͞attaiŶaďle telos of historical change [...], some sort of good society, just society and conflict-
free society,͟ but also ďǇ ͞the deregulation and privatization of the modernizing tasks and 
duties,͟ i.e. by a change in the meaning of individualization.  
In liquid modernity, individualization is no longer conceived as emancipation from the 
bonds of communal dependence. In the absence of any clear and reliable normative 
framework, ideŶtitǇ is Ŷo loŶgeƌ a ͞giǀeŶ,͟ but instead has beeŶ tƌaŶsfoƌŵed iŶto a ͞task͟ 
for which actors (now authors) are responsible: ͞ModeƌŶitǇ ƌeplaĐes the heteƌoŶomic 
determination of social standing with compulsory and obligatory self-deteƌŵiŶatioŶ͟ 
(Bauman, 2000: 32).  
However, the tasks involved in identity construction are not carried out by everyone on 
an equal footing. While for some (a few), the two poles of individualization – freedom and 
security – are mutually reinforced (freedom of movement is a guarantee of power and 
safety), for others (the majority), freedom is offered only in exchange for security and 
eǆpeƌieŶĐed as ͞a kiŶd of uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ, of daƌk pƌeŵoŶitioŶs aŶd feaƌ of the futuƌe" ;BauŵaŶ, 
2001: 48). All are warned that the prospects of survival, improvement and dignity depend 
exclusively upon oneself, and that everyone is personally responsible in the event of failure. 
But, as only some possess the necessary resources to acquire security through freedom, 
liquid modernity operates, in reality, by unequal distribution of the risks. For the majority, de 
jure autonomy does not translate into de facto autonomy; or in other words, the increase in 
negative freedom does not correspond to an increase in positive freedom.  
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Irrespective of individual circumstances, the private construction of identity is always a 
task to ďe Đaƌƌied out ǁithiŶ a ĐoŶteǆt of uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ. WheŶ the ͞Đodes aŶd ƌules͟ aƌe Ŷot 
͞self-evident,͟ no longer prescribing clearly defined obligations (Bauman, 2000: 7), when 
͞the status of all Ŷoƌŵs [...] has […] ďeeŶ severely shaken and beĐoŵe fƌagile͟ ;BauŵaŶ, 
ϮϬϬϬ: ϳϵͿ, the ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ of ideŶtitǇ teŶds to ďe tƌaŶsfoƌŵed iŶto ͞a perpetual agony of 
iŶdeĐisioŶ͟ ;BauŵaŶ, ϮϬϬϬ: ϮϬͿ, as a result of uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ as to the defiŶitioŶ of oŶe͛s oǁŶ 
purposes and as to the actions and intentions of others.  
 
2.3. Uncertainty, liquidity and their manifestations 
IŶ aŶ atŵospheƌe of uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ, iŶ a ͞ǁoƌld deǀoid of staďle aŶd tƌustǁoƌthǇ ŵeaŶiŶg,͟ 
liquidity – that is, the ͞suďstitutioŶ of the teĐhŶiƋues of esĐape aŶd elisioŶ foƌ eŶgageŵeŶt 
and mutual ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt͟ ;BauŵaŶ, ϮϬϬϬ: ϭϬϴ, ϭϬϵͿ – appears as a rational response on the 
paƌt of iŶdiǀiduals: ͚͞‘atioŶal ĐhoiĐe͛ iŶ the eƌa of iŶstaŶtaŶeitǇ ŵeaŶs to pursue 
gratification while avoiding the consequences, and particularly the responsibilities that those 
ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes iŵplǇ͟ ;BauŵaŶ, ϮϬϬϬ: 128).  
Liquidity is manifested as a loss of the meaning of personal commitment, or commitment 
ǁith a ͞life plaŶ.͟ The ǁoƌld ͞iŶ ǁhiĐh the futuƌe is at ďest diŵ aŶd ŵistǇ, ďut, ŵoƌe likelǇ, 
full of ƌisks aŶd daŶgeƌs͟ ;Bauman, 2000: 163) makes the establishment of long-term goals 
unattractive. Liquidity thus involves a modification of time – the loss of long-term meaning 
with its break-up into a sequence of moments. Foƌ those foƌ ǁhoŵ ͞doŵiŶatioŶ ĐoŶsists iŶ 
oŶe͛s oǁŶ ĐapaĐitǇ to esĐape, to diseŶgage, to ͚ďe elseǁheƌe͛͟ ;BauŵaŶ, ϮϬϬϬ: ϭϮϬͿ, 
iŶstaŶtaŶeitǇ ďeĐoŵes aŶ ideal of ƌefeƌeŶĐe. Bill Gates, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to “eŶŶett͛s oďseƌǀatioŶs, 
ŵeŶtioŶed ďǇ BauŵaŶ, ŵakes suĐĐess depeŶd upoŶ ͞positioŶiŶg oŶeself ǁithiŶ a Ŷetǁoƌk 
of possibilities rather than paralyzing oneself in one particular job.͟ This implies avoiding 
lasting attachments or commitments: 
 
He was cautious not to develop attachments (particularly a sentimental attachment) or lasting 
commitment to anything including his own creations. [Bill Gates] was not afraid of taking a 
wrong turn, since no turn would keep him going in one direction for long, and since turning 
back or aside remained constantly available options. (Bauman, 2000: 124) 
 
For Đapital aďle to ͞tƌaǀel fast aŶd tƌaǀel light͟ (Bauman, 2000: 121) the compression of 
time is a source of freedom and security. For others, it is only freedom, or rather, the 
freedom to choose consumer commodities. For these, the activity of consuming is the 
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pƌiǀileged foƌŵ of ͞esĐape fƌoŵ the agoŶǇ Đalled iŶseĐuƌitǇ͟ ;BauŵaŶ, ϮϬϬϬ: ϴϭͿ. The oďjeĐts 
displaǇed oŶ supeƌŵaƌket shelǀes aƌe thus the oŶlǇ thiŶgs that seeŵ ͞Đoŵplete ǁith the 
pƌoŵise of ĐeƌtaiŶtǇ͟ of iŵŵediate satisfaĐtioŶ ;BauŵaŶ, ϮϬϬϬ: ϴϭͿ. The life of the ĐoŶsuŵeƌ 
is a sequence of moments of gratification.  
Liquidity also involves an alteration in the meaning of interpersonal commitments. A 
world in which the future is unclear makes it uŶadǀisaďle to suƌƌeŶdeƌ ͞private interest in 
oƌdeƌ to iŶĐƌease gƌoup poǁeƌ͟ (Bauman, 2000: 1ϲϯͿ: ͞[H]oldiŶg too fast, ďuƌdeŶiŶg oŶe͛s 
bond with mutually binding commitments, may prove positively harmful and the new 
ĐhaŶĐes Đƌop up elseǁheƌe͟ ;BauŵaŶ, ϮϬϬϬ: 13).  
Those for whom freedom and security are served in a packet easily dispense with 
commitment – their safety presupposes flexibility. Others may desire stability or miss it. But, 
as the offer of security is scarce, the best alternative consists in always seeking to imitate the 
former. The consequence is  
 
[…] the fadiŶg aŶd ǁiltiŶg, deĐoŵposing and falling apart of human bonds, of communities and 
of paƌtŶeƌships. CoŵŵitŵeŶts of the ͚till death do us paƌt͛ tǇpe ďeĐoŵe ĐoŶtƌaĐts ͚uŶtil 
satisfaĐtioŶ lasts͛, teŵpoƌal aŶd tƌaŶsieŶt ďǇ defiŶitioŶ, ďǇ iŶteŶtioŶ aŶd ďǇ pƌagŵatiĐ iŵpaĐt – 
and, therefore, with the tendency to be unilaterally broken when one of the parties senses 
more opportunities and more value in abandoning the partnership than in the attempt to save 
it at whatever incalculable cost. (Bauman, 2000: 163) 
 
In the process, what is changed is the meaning of interpersonal relationships: ͞ďoŶds aŶd 
partnerships tend to be treated as things meant to be consumed, not produced; they are 
suďjeĐt to the saŵe Đƌiteƌia of eǀaluatioŶ as all otheƌ oďjeĐts of ĐoŶsuŵptioŶ͟ ;BauŵaŶ, 
2000: 163). 
 
2.4. Social construction and the instability of identity 
Contrary to what might be imagined, the construction of identity in liquid modernity has not 
stopped being a social process. What has changed are the mechanisms in that process. In 
the absence of the invisible Big Brother of the first modernity, able to stipulate absolute 
values and prescribe objectives that had to be pursued, the question of values has also been 
privatized and transferred to individuals. The uncertainty of means is now joined by a new 
type of uncertainty – aŶ uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ of eŶds, ǁhiĐh ĐoŶsists iŶ deteƌŵiŶiŶg, ͞iŶ the faĐe of all 
the ƌisks kŶoǁŶ oƌ ŵeƌelǇ guessed, ǁhiĐh of the ŵaŶǇ floatiŶg seduĐtiǀe eŶds ͚ǁithiŶ ƌeaĐh͛ 
[...] offeƌ pƌioƌitǇ͟ ;BauŵaŶ, ϮϬϬϬ: ϲϭͿ.  
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Individuals, although separate, do not decide upon ends with their backs turned to one 
another. They observe each other attentively and anxiously, in the expectation of finding not 
only proof that they are not the only ones experiencing the agony of uncertainty, but also 
͞eǆaŵples͟ – signs of ends that are worth pursuing. The others, on the other hand, offer 
themselves up as oďjeĐts of ĐoŶsuŵptioŶ iŶ ͞a scene on which private dramas are staged, 
put on publiĐ displaǇ aŶd puďliĐlǇ ǁatĐhed͟ (Bauman, 2000: ϳϬͿ oƌ as ͞counsellors͟ iŶ a 
market of examples.  
To ďe aŶ oďjeĐt of ͞desire aŶd adŵiƌatioŶ͟ (Bauman, 2000: 67) is the condition for a 
ĐouŶselloƌ͛s success and authority in the market of examples, and proof of the importance 
of the values that s/he promotes. However, the causal bond between the will to follow an 
example and the authority of the exemplary person is not clear: ͞AuthoƌitǇ eǆpaŶds the 
ranks of the followers, but, in the world of uncertain and chronically underdetermined ends, 
it is the number of the followers that makes – that is – the authoƌitǇ͟ ;BauŵaŶ, ϮϬϬϬ: 67).  
The ǀalue of the eǆaŵples is ŶeĐessaƌilǇ pƌeĐaƌious: ͞Eǆaŵples aŶd ƌeĐipes ƌeŵaiŶ 
attƌaĐtiǀe as loŶg as theǇ ƌeŵaiŶ uŶtested͟ ;BauŵaŶ, ϮϬϬϬ: ϳϮͿ. As theƌe is Ŷo eǆaŵple 
capable of fulfilling its promises of lasting satisfaĐtioŶ, the ƌeĐipes foƌ a ͞good life͟ teŶd to 
become obsolete even before they reach their sell-by date. For individuals, the attempt to 
reduce the uncertainty of ends by observing examples tends to turn consumption into an 
addiction, and like all addictions, it ͞destƌoǇ[s] the possibility of being ever satisfied͟ 
(Bauman, 2000: 72) – the more it is practised and the more frustrations it originates, the 
more necessary it becomes, generating even more frustrations. In society, the value of 
examples is ephemeral – examples pass from fame to oblivion unpredictably or 
uncontrollably, like the winds or tides.  
 
2.5. The commodification of commitment and the instability of interpersonal relations 
The change in the meaning of interpersonal commitment arising from the commodification 
of social bonds, that is, from their subjection to the cash nexus, consequently removes all 
responsibility for the fate of relationships. When the relationship is conceived as an 
acquisition on the market, its continuity becomes conditioned only by the test of 
satisfaction. Trying to contribute actively to maintain it, with sacrifice if necessary, makes 
aďout as ŵuĐh seŶse as ŵakiŶg aŶ effoƌt to like a pƌoduĐt that does Ŷot liǀe up to oŶe͛s 
expectations. In a disappointing relationship, as in the case of a disappointing product, the 
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natural thing to do, whenever possible, is to exchange it for something else. Consequently, 
the precariousness of relations tends to turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy:  
 
If the human bond, like all other consumer objects, is not worked out through protracted 
effort and occasional sacrifice, but something which one expects to bring satisfaction right 
away, instantaneously, at the moment of purchase – and something that one rejects if it does 
not satisfy [...] – then theƌe is Ŷot ŵuĐh poiŶt iŶ ͚thƌoǁiŶg good ŵoŶeǇ afteƌ ďad͛, in trying 
hard and harder still, let alone in suffering discomfort and unease in order to save the 
partnership. (Bauman, 2000: 164)  
 
 
2.6. Uncertainty, liquidity and insecurity 
Uncertainty, which for most people is experienced as insecurity and anxiety, leading as a 
rational response to the search for liquidity, tends to produce increased systemic instability 
and insecurity. Of the consequences involved in this tendency, Bauman highlights social 
fragmentation.  
LiƋuid ŵodeƌŶitǇ is a tiŵe of ͞seĐessioŶ͟ iŶ ǁhiĐh those ŵost skilled at the aƌt of eǀasioŶ 
manage to detach themselves from their commitments and responsibilities. But, as this 
͞seĐessioŶ͟ ďƌiŶgs togetheƌ fugitiǀes fƌoŵ otheƌ similar situations, the process gives rise to 
͞ďuďďles͟, sheltered spaces that are communities only in name, sealed from the outside and 
united only by the perception of an external threat. The ƌesult is ͞ghettoizatioŶ͟ – a process 
of ͞spatial ĐoŶfiŶeŵeŶt and social enclosure" (Bauman, 2001: 117), which is self-fulfilling.  
 
Channelling the emotions generated by existential uncertainty into a frantic search foƌ ͚safetǇ-
in-ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ͛ acts as all other self-fulfilling prophecies do: once embarked on, it tends to 
suďstaŶtiate its oƌigiŶal ŵotiǀes aŶd pƌoduĐe eǀeƌ Ŷeǁ ͚good ƌeasoŶs͛ aŶd justifiĐatioŶs foƌ the 
original move. (Bauman, 2001: 118) 
 
When the outside appears iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ thƌeateŶiŶg, the ͞ǀoluŶtaƌǇ ghettos,͟ which are 
entered on the belief that it is always possible to leave, gradually become more and more 
like real ghettos. The fragmented society may then become something truly dangerous – a 
fertile ground for the expansion of the market of law and order.  
But the fragmented society which, according to Bauman, will result from liquefaction, is 
also a soĐietǇ that dissolǀes the ͞forces that could keep the questions of order and system 
oŶ the politiĐal ageŶda͟ aŶd the ͞ďoŶds ǁhiĐh iŶteƌloĐk iŶdiǀidual ĐhoiĐes iŶ ĐolleĐtiǀe 
pƌojeĐts aŶd aĐtioŶs͟ ;BauŵaŶ, Ϯ000: 6):  
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The kind of uncertainty, of dark premonitions and fears that haunt men and women in the 
fluid, perpetually changing social environment in which the rules of the game change in the 
middle of the game without warning or legible pattern, does not unite sufferers: it splits them. 
The pains it causes to the individuals do not add up, do not accumulate or condense into a kind 
of ͚ĐoŵŵoŶ Đause͛ ǁhiĐh Đould ďe puƌsued ŵoƌe effeĐtiǀelǇ ďǇ joiŶiŶg foƌĐes aŶd aĐtiŶg iŶ 
unison. (Bauman, 2001: 48) 
 
BauŵaŶ͛s liquidity is a cumulative process. It is a trap, a dystopia capable of replacing the 
nightmares of Orwell and Huxley.  
 
ϯ. KeyŶes’s liquidity 
KeǇŶes͛s liquidity has its origins in the separation of property and control, and is, 
simultaneously, a condition of that separation, occurring for the first time, as in Bauman, at 
the moment when the owner of the orchestra discovers that he does not necessarily have to 
conduct it.  
There was a time, Keynes recalls at the beginning of his famous Chapter 12 of the General 
Theory, iŶ ǁhiĐh eŶteƌpƌises ͞ǁeƌe ŵaiŶlǇ oǁŶed ďǇ those ǁho uŶdeƌtook theŵ oƌ ďǇ theiƌ 
fƌieŶds aŶd assoĐiates͟ aŶd ͞iŶǀestŵeŶt depeŶded oŶ a suffiĐieŶt supplǇ of iŶdiǀiduals of 
sanguine temperament and constructive impulses who embarked upon business as a way of 
life͟ ;KeǇŶes, ϭϵϯϲ: 150). In these cases, investment decisions were irrevocable, 
͞iŶdissoluďle, like ŵaƌƌiage͟ ;KeǇŶes, ϭϵϯϲ: ϭϲϬͿ. At that tiŵe, ͞pƌoduĐtiǀe͟ iŶǀestŵeŶt ǁas 
solid (or fixed).  
With the ĐƌeatioŶ oƌ deǀelopŵeŶt of oƌgaŶised ͞iŶǀestment markets,͟ this era came to an 
end. ChaƌaĐteƌised ďǇ liƋuiditǇ, ͞iŶǀestŵeŶt ŵaƌkets͟ undertake a daily reassessment of 
investment – something which did not make sense in the previous context, characterised by 
the indissolubility of the bonds of the investor with his assets – and as they reassess, they 
giǀe the iŶdiǀidual the oppoƌtuŶitǇ ͞to ƌeǀise his ĐoŵŵitŵeŶts" ;KeǇŶes, ϭϵϯϲ: ϭϱϭͿ, i.e. to 
get rid of his assets in order to acquire – or not – others offered on the market. These 
markets seem to be a fantastic institutional innovation which brings together the best of 
both worlds: the income that treasures cannot promise and the liquidity that was believed 
to be an attribute of treasures.  
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3.1. The ambiguity of liquidity 
However, for Keynes, liquidity was ambiguous, involving what he himself considered to be a 
dilemma: it ͞ofteŶ faĐilitates, though it soŵetiŵes iŵpedes, the Đouƌse of Ŷeǁ iŶǀestŵeŶt͟ 
(Keynes, 1936: 160).  
The reason why liquidity may facilitate investment becomes clear from the moment we 
uŶdeƌstaŶd the ͞eǆtƌeŵe pƌeĐaƌiousŶess of the ďasis of kŶoǁledge oŶ ǁhiĐh our estimates 
of pƌospeĐtiǀe Ǉield haǀe to ďe ŵade͟ ;KeǇŶes, ϭϵϯϲ: ϭϰϵͿ. In a context of uncertainty, 
liquidity is the emergency exit that the investor needs to know exists, before daring to enter 
a poorly-lit tunnel whose end is out of sight. It is the escape route, in the event of an 
emergency: ͞Foƌ the faĐt that eaĐh iŶdiǀidual iŶǀestoƌ flatteƌs hiŵself that his ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt 
is ͚liƋuid͛ […] calms his nerves and makes him much more ǁilliŶg to ƌuŶ a ƌisk͟ ;KeǇŶes, 
1936: 149).  
It is clear, however, as Keynes reminds us, that investment decisions are revocable for the 
individual, but not for the community – there is an absence of micro-macro correspondence 
that can translate into a reduction of individual risk which is not transposable to the 
collective.  
More complex is the reason why liquidity may impede the course of new investment. 
͞IŶǀestŵeŶt ŵaƌkets͟ were set up on the assumption that they would facilitate the miracle 
of the invisible hand and ensure that capital was applied to more socially advantageous uses. 
According to Keynes, things in fact happen the other way around. Let us imagine, however 
absurd it may seem, that an omniscient trader considers it advantageous to invest a large 
sum of money in setting up a new company. Would he be prepared to go ahead with this if 
there were a cheaper equiǀaleŶt deal aǀailaďle oŶ the ͞iŶǀestŵeŶt ŵaƌket͟? In that case, 
the new investment would be abandoned in exchange for the acquisition of shares in an 
already-existing business; his assessment of the (liquid) market would have impeded the 
new investment. But why would the market assess the investment below its fundamental 
value – that is, the value that only the omniscient agent knows?  
The market can be ͞mistaken͟; indeed it tends to make mistakes systematically, because 
there are no omniscient agents, or at least, no agents that are considered omniscient by the 
others, and because individual choices made in a context of uncertainty are not 
independent.  
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The value of assets is conventional in nature; that is, it results from a multiplicity of 
decentralised, but not independent, decisions. The awareness that the value of assets results 
from a multiplicity of decisions justifies each individual takiŶg aĐĐouŶt of otheƌs͛ choices 
when making his own decisions. In fact, his gains and losses depend upon his capacity to 
predict the choices made by the others. And, to the extent that the decisions of each of 
those others are also conditioned by expectations of the same type, it is a question of 
guessing what others think others will do. IŶ the ͞iŶǀestŵeŶt ŵaƌkets,͟ as Keynes wrote, it is 
not only a question of predicting which assets are going to go up, or which the others think 
are going to go up; rather, there is a third degree of recursivity involved, namely 
͞anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be.͟ Indeed, there may 
eǀeŶ ďe those that ͞pƌaĐtise the fouƌth, fifth aŶd higheƌ degƌees͟ of ƌeĐuƌsiǀitǇ ;KeǇŶes, 
1936: 156).  
Keynes terms this activity of second-, third- or higher-degree prediction speculation, 
which he considers a form of game-playing, contrasting it with enterprise, i.e. ͞the activity of 
forecasting the prospective yield of assets oǀeƌ theiƌ ǁhole life͟ (Keynes, 1936: 158) – which 
is known today as the fundamental value of assets. In the world of financial liquidity, 
speculation may be considered as a kind of rational behaviour – if rationality is redefined 
(Orléan, 1999; Rodrigues, 2007). Speculation, Keynes writes (1936: 155),  
 
[…] is Ŷot the outĐoŵe of a ǁƌoŶg-headed propensity. It is the inevitable result of an 
investment market organised along the lines described. For it is not sensible to pay 25 for an 
investment of which you believe the prospective yield to justify a value of 30, if you also 
believe that the market will value it at 20 three months hence.  
 
IŶ this ŵaƌket, it ǁould ďe iƌƌatioŶal to ďase oŶe͛s iŶǀestŵeŶt deĐisioŶs oŶ the kŶoǁledge 
that is available about the profitability of an asset:  
 
Investment based on genuine long-term expectation is so difficult today as to be scarcely 
practicable. He who attempts it must surely lead much more laborious days and run greater 
risks that he who tries to guess better than the crowd how the crowd will behave. (Keynes, 
1936: 157) 
 
3.2. Self-referentiality of speculation and instability 
Today we understand, better than in Keynes' day, that systems like the financial markets 
may behave in a complex, even chaotic, fashion. In these markets, as Orléan (1999: 59) 
eǆplaiŶs, ͞ŵaƌket opiŶioŶ is at the saŵe tiŵe the oďjeĐt that eaĐh peƌsoŶ is tƌǇiŶg to pƌediĐt, 
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and the product – what emerges from the individual opinions when each of those individuals 
is trying to discover the majority opinion.͟  
Referring to this dynamics as self-referential, Orléan shows that, in certain circumstances, 
self-ƌefeƌeŶtial gƌoups ͞ŵaŶage to staďilise thƌough the eŶdogeŶous pƌoduĐtioŶ of a ďelief 
ƌeĐogŶised ďǇ all͟ ;OƌléaŶ, ϭϵϵϵ: ϲϬͿ – a convention – and shows at the same time that these 
conventions may enter into collapse when under attack by speculators seeking advantages 
ďǇ ͞plaǇiŶg͟ agaiŶst theŵ.  
 
3.3. The liquidity trap and the need for heteronomic regulation 
Liquidity, which, in the financial markets, seems to be a rational response to uncertainty, 
teŶds to giǀe ƌise to sǇsteŵiĐ iŶstaďilitǇ, iŶĐƌeasiŶg the iŶdiǀidual͛s uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ. IŶ this 
context, what appeared extraordinary to Keynes was that, despite everything, there was still 
room for enterprise. If enterprise had rational grounds, if it depended upon simple 
calculation – oŶ the ͞ǁeighted aǀeƌage of ƋuaŶtitatiǀe ďeŶefits ŵultiplied by quantitative 
pƌoďaďilities͟ – it ǁould loŶg ago haǀe ͞faded aŶd died͟ ;KeǇŶes, ϭϵϯϲ: ϭϲϭ-162). If it still 
exists, it is because it depends more on spontaneous optimism or animal spirits – ͞a 
spoŶtaŶeous uƌge to aĐtioŶ͟ – rather than on the outcome of a mathematical calculation.  
But as that spontaneous optimism that enables people to act despite uncertainty is, like 
any psychological state, inconstant, the ͞eĐoŶoŵiĐ life of the ŵodeƌŶ ǁoƌld͟ ǁill ŶeĐessaƌilǇ 
ďe affliĐted ďǇ ͞Đƌises of ĐoŶfideŶĐe͟ ;KeǇŶes, ϭϵϯϲ: 161). In contexts of crises of confidence, 
when fear paralyses those animal spirits, torn between consumption, investment and 
liquidity, agents tend to choose the most liquid of assets – money.  
We ĐaŶ Ŷoǁ foƌŵulate KeǇŶes͛s dilemma in another way: the markets contain panic, in 
ďoth seŶses of the ǁoƌd ͞ĐoŶtaiŶ͟ ;Dupuis, ϭϵϵϮͿ. LiƋuiditǇ ͞Đalŵs the Ŷeƌǀes͟ aŶd 
encourages the formation of capital, while at the same time generating instability and 
͞Đƌises of ĐoŶfideŶĐe,͟ ǁhiĐh ƌesult in a disorderly race for the emergency exit.  
For Keynes, as we know, laissez faire would not survive commotions of these 
proportions. For him, order and the reproduction of the market society depended upon a 
centre of rationality that is outside it: ͞I eǆpeĐt to see the “tate, ǁhiĐh is iŶ a positioŶ to 
calculate the marginal efficiency of capital-goods on long views and on the basis of the 
general social advantage, taking an ever greater responsibility for directly organising 
iŶǀestŵeŶt͟ ;KeǇŶes, ϭϵϯϲ: ϭϲϰͿ.  
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4. The mechanisms of liquidity 
This comparative reading of Bauman and Keynes suggests, as I have already mentioned, the 
existence of transversal liquidity mechanisms that cut across different institutional domains. 
Consideration of this hypothesis involves a generalization of different key concepts, present 
iŶ ďoth authoƌs͛ appƌoaĐh to the ƋuestioŶ of liƋuiditǇ. These aƌe: uncertainty, expectations, 
rationality, irrationality, enterprise, speculation, conventions, norms, instability of 
conventions and the liquidity trap. In this section, I will discuss these concepts in pairs.  
 
4.1. Uncertainty and expectations 
Uncertainty, conceived broadly and informally as a mental state of doubt about the best 
course of action to take (Beckert, 1996) – a situation in which the actor simply does not 
know what to do – is obviously a common state in life, even if it is more pronounced in some 
cases than in others.  
This applies to the Keynesian type of uncertainty. This type of uncertainty, which is 
manifested in a particularly acute form in the monetary and financial markets, may be 
present in all situations in which the consequences of actions are projected into a long-term 
future, without there being any knowledge base that enables probabilistic expectations to 
be formulated.  
But Keynesian uncertainty (uncertainty as to the best means of achieving clear ends, 
resulting from a lack of knowledge – the epistemic uncertainty of means) is not the only form 
of uncertainty, nor the only relevant form. Bauman speaks of an uncertainty of ends, an 
axiological uncertainty, which refers to the mental state of doubt about what ends should be 
pursued. He also suggests a third type of uncertainty – a deontic uncertainty, concerning 
duties and obligations – which involves doubt as to the individual's relationship with norms.  
Recognition of these three types of uncertainty naturally involves ontology of the actor 
that is not that of economic orthodoxy. It presupposes an actor that recognises the norms as 
such, that is, as rules that prescribe obligations, the compulsoriness of which is not solely 
determined by a judgement based on a cost-benefit computation. It also presupposes an 
actor who is able to reflect upon his/her own preferences and to choose what ends to 
pursue – an actor that is autonomous, though limitedly so, in the sense that, in forming his 
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beliefs, he depends not only upon himself but also upon others (both in the process of 
socialization and in the situational context).  
Action in a context of uncertainty is always based upon expectations which, like forms of 
uncertainty, may be epistemic, axiological and deontic. The transversal mechanisms of 
liquidity involve these three types of uncertainty and expectations.  
 
4.2. Rationality and irrationality 
The recognition of non-probabilistic uncertainty leads to a reconceptualization of rationality. 
KeǇŶes͛s agent does not simply have the cognitive resources that enable him to choose 
rationally (in the terms prescribed by the rational decision theory). He can only be rational if 
rationality is conceived in the broader sense of justified choice. The relevant rationality in 
the framework of transversal liquidity mechanisms refers to deliberation processes that 
operate in parallel upon ends (subject to reconfiguration) and (given and discovered) means.  
What is irrational in this perspective is the unsuitability of means to ends – the choice of 
ends that cannot be achieved with the means available, or of means that do not lead to the 
chosen end.  
 
4.3. Enterprise and speculation 
IŶ KeǇŶes͛s terms, the entrepreneur is the iŶǀestoƌ ǁho ͞diƌeĐt[s] his ŵiŶd to the long-term 
pƌospeĐts aŶd to those oŶlǇ͟ ;KeǇŶes, ϭϵϯϲ: 160), basing his decisions upon estimations of 
the fundamental value of assets. Enterprise can be generalized and integrated into the 
transversal liquidity mechanisms as an attitude of commitment to a life project or 
interpersonal relationship. Commitment involves responsibility – the awareness that the fate 
of the project or the relationship depends, at least in part, on a personal contribution and on 
a disposition to contribute, which is translated into practice – as well as a belief in the 
fundamental value of the project or relationship, that is, in its intrinsic non-conventional 
value.  
Liquidity is a state of non-commitment in what concerns both life plans and relations with 
others. Preference for liquidity is a rational response to uncertainty, any type of uncertainty, 
which, when generalized, tends to cause enterprise to be replaced with speculation.  
Speculation, which in the financial markets consists of predicting the conventional value 
of assets, when generalized becomes the selection of ends guided by authoritative 
͞eǆaŵples,͟ as ŵeŶtioned by Bauman, or the conditioning of normative obligations to the 
RCCS Annual Review, 1, September 2009                                                                                                                                           Liquidity Mechanisms  
148 
anticipated degree of compliance shown by others with those same obligations. Speculation, 
therefore, involves deliberation and action that are oriented by conventional assessments.  
 
4.4. Conventions and norms 
The conventions that for Keynes are procedures for the formation of expectations, and the 
expectations on the value of assets themselves, may be generalized as intersubjective beliefs 
that emerge from the interaction between agents. They are not based upon any 
fundamental value external to the self-referential game of beliefs, a situation that is 
subjectively acknowledged. In contrast, norms are intersubjective beliefs that are rooted in 
fundamental values and are recognised as such by agents; thus, they may motivate action 
irrespective of any cost-benefit analysis.  
The fact that norms refer to fundamental values is no guarantee that agents will 
automatically adhere to them (that is why sanctions exist when there is failure to comply), 
since, in relation to norms, there is always room for the justification of non-compliance, as a 
consequence of conflict with other norms, interpretation and expectations as to compliance 
by others. The last aspect is particularly important in the sense that it suggests that norms 
are also subject to self-referential processes with an impact on deontic expectations, 
although the external nature of the fundamental value relative to the self-referential game 
may provide greater stability.  
On the other hand, the fact that conventions are not rooted in fundamental values does 
not exclude the possibility that they may constitute grounds for stable beliefs and 
expectations. Some conventions acquire such a degree of stability that they endure even 
when there are strong reasons for being abandoned.  
 
4.5. Instability of conventions 
At the liŵit, BauŵaŶ͛s liƋuid ŵodeƌŶitǇ, like KeǇŶes͛s financial markets, involves social 
systems devoid of fundamental values – not because those values do not exist, but precisely 
because they are in conflict with one another. Order in these systems is based on 
conventions. Keynes and his successors have described the self-referential dynamics of 
conventions in the financial markets. BauŵaŶ͛s speĐulaƌ gaŵe ǁith ƌespeĐt to aǆiologiĐal 
uncertainty illustrates this well in the domain of ends. Something similar may occur with 
obligations. Since the normative disposition of the agent with limited autonomy is 
conditioned by the expectation that others will comply (i.e. it involves the expectation of 
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reciprocity [Gintis et al, 2005]), his/her deontic expectations are also subject to the now 
familiar self-referential process: my disposition depends upon the disposition of others, 
ǁhose dispositioŶ iŶ tuƌŶs depeŶds upoŶ…  
Conventions are arbitrary – they are not based upon any fundamental value. But if they 
remained stable, despite being arbitrary, as in some of the equilibrium outcomes achieved 
ďǇ “ĐhelliŶg͛s ͞ĐƌitiĐal ŵass ŵodels͟ ;ϭϵϳϴͿ, theƌe ǁould ďe Ŷo ƌatioŶal gƌouŶds foƌ desiƌiŶg 
liquidity. Agents would formulate their expectations on the basis of conventions that would 
become self-fulfilling prophecies.  
Liquidity is sought because it is not possible to trust the stability of conventions. If in 
some circumstances conventions are stable, as pointed out above, the fundamental question 
is to understand the reasons why they might not be so.  
Conventions are stable when most agents have no reason to abandon them, or if, despite 
there being good reasons to do so, this will bring unbearable costs for an agent acting in 
isolation (Runde, 1991). In a country where cars drive on the left, there might be advantages 
to driving on the right in a traffic jam; however, the risks inherent in that choice are 
sufficient to deter most drivers. Even in the financial markets, it is possible to find examples. 
Keynes suggests one: as disapproval is most likely when one errs against a convention than 
when one errs with it, wage-earners will tend to follow the convention even when they have 
reasons to believe that they will lose out by doing so.  
When there are good reasons to abandon the convention, and when this does not involve 
prohibitive costs, there is the potential for the convention to become unstable. Amongst the 
various good reasons we could count: the conveŶtioŶ͛s deǀiatioŶ fƌoŵ that ǁhiĐh the aĐtoƌ 
takes as a fundamental value; incentives arising from opportunities to gain in counter-
ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶal ͞gaŵďles,͟ as occurs with large speculators on the stock exchange; or the 
disclosure of new information.  
The last aspect, underlined by Keynes, is particularly important. In the world of non-
commitment, the mind is focused on everything except on that whose advantages may only 
be realised in the long term; it tends, particularly, to concentrate upon current facts, whose 
importance may result not from the relevance of the facts themselves, but from the 
importance that is believed to be attributed to them by others. In this way, completely 
irrelevant events may break a convention. There are abundant examples in the financial 
markets. There are also a great many examples in the domain of ends and obligations: media 
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coverage of an example may be enough to cause crowds to change direction, just as the 
puďliĐatioŶ of a Ŷotaďle Đase of taǆ eǀasioŶ ŵaǇ pƌoǀide ͞justifiĐatioŶ͟ foƌ ŵillioŶs of otheƌs 
to do the same (Gintis et al, 2005).  
 
4.6. The liquidity trap 
Conventional orders are by nature unstable and are constantly at risk of collapse. The 
liquidity trap represents that collapse in Keynes – once trust is lost in conventions, agents 
take refuge in the most liquid of assets. To put it in general terms, the liquidity trap 
corresponds to the rupture of all commitments, whatever form those might take, to mass 
divestment and panic.  
In Bauman, the panic resulting from the loss of confidence takes two forms: The first is 
the non-aggregation of individual suffering in common causes; the second, escape – seeking 
ƌefuge iŶside pƌoteĐted ͞bubbles.͟ BauŵaŶ͛s tǁo foƌŵs have in common the refusal to 
͞iŶǀest͟ in social relations or to enter into commitments and obligations of any kind.  
The first kind of trap leads Bauman to the representation of liquid modernity as a society 
devoid of means that enable it to act upon the systemic origin of individual suffering – a 
blocked society.  
Collective action, as the abundant theoretical and empirical research into the subject has 
shown (Ostrom, 1990, Gintis et al., 2005), depends crucially upon prospects of indefinite 
continuation of interactions, being therefore incompatible with the precarious relations 
characteristic of liquid modernity. Bauman is particularly concerned with the impossibility of 
collective action in the political sphere. However, there are other domains, including those 
that most concern economists, in which this implication of liquidity is manifested.  
In modern companies and organizations, cooperation has always been a prerequisite for 
production as important as the division of labour, monitoring and coercion. Companies and 
organizations have always claimed not only the bodies but also the souls of their employees. 
But, ǁhile ͞solid͟ ŵodeƌŶitǇ tƌusted ŵoƌe iŶ the ĐoŶtƌol of the ďodǇ thaŶ the soul, post-
panoptic modernity requires both in equal proportion. This is clear in the development of 
the ͞ŵaŶageŵeŶt sĐieŶĐes,͟ which are no longer simply a form of social engineering, but 
have become a way of engineering minds, involving pathetic identification rituals such as 
those that are now frequently staged by companies and other organizations.  
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But, in conditions of liquid modernity, loyalty – friction on exit in Hirschman (1970) – is 
more difficult to cultivate: concentrating on the art of escape, residents are more concerned 
with the acquisition of skills and with the realisation of deeds that can facilitate their exit, or 
which make the threat of exit more credible, than with the realisation of tasks that could 
contribute to the continuation of the collective undertaking. In post-panoptic companies and 
organizations, just as in the political sphere, liquidity may dissolve the grounds for collective 
action.  
BauŵaŶ͛s seĐoŶd kiŶd of tƌap is the paŶiĐkǇ flight toǁaƌds the ǁalled ƌefuge of the 
hoŵe oƌ ͞ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ,͟ a flight through emergency exits that is not disorderly, in the sense 
that each person races to the door that seems to be chosen by those who are similar to 
him/her, just to find him/herself on the other side amongst a group of likeminded souls, 
united in their fear of the outside, but in all other respects as separate as before. As the 
result, albeit unintentional, of this movement is segregation (Schelling, 1978), the fractured 
society that results from this collective exit is even more dangerous than that which justified 
the flight. Bauman illustrates this process with the case of closed condominiums and other 
segregated residential areas in cities of liquid modernity. However, something similar may 
occur with the fragmentation of public health and education services as a consequence of 
the exit of the middle and upper classes.  
It is difficult to conceive human cohabitation in a merely conventional order, since 
contracts (the institutional instrument presented as the cement of liquid modernity) depend 
much more than we suppose upon a cluster of institutionalised normative values and 
obligations. As all contracts are incomplete, although to varying degrees, the viability of 
contractual bonds always depends upon the non-contractual element that they necessarily 
involve – the Ŷoƌŵatiǀe oďligatioŶ to ƌespeĐt oŶe͛s pƌoŵises. The gƌouŶds foƌ Ŷoƌŵatiǀe 
obligation, as is well known, may be prudence or honesty. The problem is that liquidity does 
not appear to foster either of these virtues, as both prudence and honesty presuppose 
stable and continuous relational contexts.  
The effeĐtiǀeŶess of the ĐoŶtƌaĐt depeŶds upoŶ ͞soŵethiŶg͟ ŵoƌe than its specification, 
monitorization and the threat of sanctions. Arrow called that thing trust. The problem is that 
trust, as Arrow reminds us, is an asset that money cannot buy: ͞if we have to buy it, you 
already have some doubts about what you have bought " (Arrow, 1974. 23).  
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5. Concluding notes 
In the light of this analysis, liquid modernity (i.e. society devoid of normative references and 
shared values, a merely conventional order) appears impossible, an unrealizable utopia – or 
dystopia. The art of escape, when practised by everyone at the same time, destroys itself, 
becoming a trap – generalised flight which hampers the establishment of any long-lasting 
commitments or ties, including those that liquid modernity itself, based on contracts, 
presupposes. But, to the extent that attempts to realise the utopia of liquidity can, and 
manifestly do, exist, it is worth trying to predict some of the possible futures that might 
result from it.  
BauŵaŶ͛s aŶalǇsis, like PolaŶǇi͛s ;ϭϵϰϰͿ, suggests that ŵoǀeŵeŶt towards liquefaction (or 
the realization of the market society) necessarily unleashes a counter-movement. That 
counter-movement, however, is politically indeterminate – it may give rise to different 
scenarios. Bauman indicates two possible scenarios, distinct but interrelated, and a 
contrasting counter-scenario. The first, inspired by Erich Fromm, foresees that  
 
[…] ǁheŶ ͞each individual must go ahead and try his luck,͟ ǁheŶ ͞he had to sǁiŵ oƌ siŶk͟ – 
͞the Đoŵpulsiǀe Ƌuest foƌ ĐeƌtaiŶtǇ͟ takes off, the despeƌate seaƌĐh foƌ ͞solutioŶs͟ aďle to 
͞eliminate the awareness of douďt͟ begins – anythiŶg is ǁelĐoŵe that pƌoŵises to ͞assume 
the ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ foƌ ͚ĐeƌtaiŶtǇ͛.͟ (Bauman, 2000: 20) 
 
To the extent that goǀeƌŶŵeŶts, ͞iŵpoteŶt to stƌike at the ƌoots of the existential insecurity 
aŶd aŶǆietǇ of theiƌ suďjeĐts͟ ;BauŵaŶ, ϮϬϬϬ: 109), may feel tempted to provide security 
(although in the form of derivative products, oriented towards safeguarding the body and 
property), the ͞Đoŵpulsiǀe Ƌuest foƌ ĐeƌtaiŶtǇ͟ ŵaǇ degenerate into paroxysms of security.  
BauŵaŶ͛s seĐoŶd sĐeŶaƌio, the flight to the ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ, leads to ghettoizatioŶ. 
Complemented by an emptying of the functions of sovereignty to the point that the State 
loses its monopoly on coercion, this would lead to a transfer of State violence to the neo-
tribal violence of communities.  
Refusing to admit the possibility of any community reinsertion, Bauman rests his hopes 
on a counter-sĐeŶaƌio iŶ ǁhiĐh soĐial oƌdeƌ is ĐoŶstƌuĐted ͞by confrontation, debate, 
negotiation and compromise between values, preferences and chosen ways of life and self-
identifications of many and different, but always self-determining, members of the polis͟ 
(Bauman, 2000: ϭϳϴͿ. What he is pƌoposiŶg is the ͞ƌepuďliĐaŶ ŵodel of uŶitǇ,͟ the only one 
he ĐoŶsideƌs Đoŵpatiďle ǁith ͞the ĐoŶditioŶs of liƋuid ŵodeƌŶitǇ.͟  
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The pƌoďleŵ is hoǁ to ŵake this saŵe ŵodeƌŶitǇ ǁhiĐh led to the ͞ĐoƌƌosioŶ aŶd sloǁ 
disintegration of citizenship" (Bauman, 2000: 36) evolve in the direction of unity in 
difference. We doŶ͛t kŶoǁ hoǁ, Ŷoƌ ǁhetheƌ, it is possiďle. Like BauŵaŶ, ǁe ĐaŶ oŶlǇ ǁaƌŶ 
and hope that the diagnosis, by unveiling the lost nexus between objective conditions and 
subjeĐtiǀe eǆpeƌieŶĐes, ǁill help ͞disĐlosiŶg the possiďilitǇ of liǀiŶg togetheƌ diffeƌeŶtlǇ͟ 
(Bauman, 2000: 215) and arouse the will to succeed.  
Translated by Karen Bennett 
Revised by Teresa Tavares 
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